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Abstract
In developing countries, moneylenders who lend to farmers monitor them to make
sure that their investment is not diverted. Similarly, modern production contracts
o⁄ered by supermarkets or agro-export ￿rms entail a loan component under the form
of input advances and, like traditional moneylenders, supermarkets also want to make
sure that this investment is not diverted. However, unlike moneylenders, supermarkets
do care about the attributes of the product (form, quality, food safety, etc.). Whether
such attributes are present in the harvested product is largely in￿ uenced by the advice
and the extension services received by the farmer. We built a ￿nancial contracting
model where we show that supermarkets, choosing to forgo specialization, optimally
delegate to a multi-tasking agent both the monitoring and the advisory missions. This
contract is shown to potentially enhance credit access for small farmers and sometimes
to involve excessive monitoring. Finally, when involved in production, small farmers
are shown to bene￿t the most, even though the supermarket has all bargaining power
when making the contract o⁄er.
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2Introduction
In the last two decades, we have witnessed an impressive development of supermarket chains
in developing countries. Saturation and intense competition in retail markets of developed
countries, together with substantial margins o⁄ered by investing in developing markets, have
largely contributed to the emergence of supermarket chains.3 In countries where a substan-
tial portion of the population lives in rural areas, the rise of supermarkets, that arguably
a⁄ect the livelihood of farmers, is a sensitive issue. Although they represent a source of
investment in local economies, their real welfare impacts are hard to assess and remain con-
troversial. On the one hand, many empirical studies have found that supermarkets tend
to leave behind or exploit small growers, preferring to concentrate their procurement of
fresh agricultural products in larger scale operations (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Dolan,
Humphrey and Harris-Pascal 2001 and Trail 2006).4 On the other hand, although many
growers successfully work with supermarkets, it is not clear whether growers who fail to
enter a business relationship with them are worse o⁄ relative to the period preceding their
entry. In addition, other recent case studies have somewhat challenged the view that su-
permarkets have only a negative impact on small growers. In particular, these studies show
that in niche markets small growers perform remarkably well and remain an attractive supply
source for supermarket chains (Boselie, Henson and Weatherspoon 2003; Henson, Masakure
and Boselie 2005 and Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen forthcoming). However, while
arguments on both sides are compelling, it is somewhat di¢ cult, in light of these (rather)
contradictory observations, to forge a clear understanding of the impact of supermarkets on
grower activity. The objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate by providing
a theoretical framework to analyze the impact that supermarkets have on growers￿credit
3For instance, Carrefour, a French-based supermarket chain, earned on average three times higher mar-
gins in its Argentine operations than in those located in France (Reardon et al., 2003).
4While the local demand for food is globally increasing, supermarket chains established in developing
countries also export a substantial portion of their production to developed countries (Dolan and Humphrey
2000). Thus, supermarket production will only exclude a portion of the growers that remains uninvolved
with the supermarket.
3access.
There exists an important descriptive literature on supermarkets in developing countries.
This literature describes and discusses what these retail chains are trying to accomplish and
how they achieve their goals. First, it must be noted that besides the growing (local) de-
mand for fresh food products that they try to meet, supermarkets or their a¢ liated grocers
demand a substantially higher quality in the products they procure. Thus, supermarkets
not only need to sell more in local markets, but they need to o⁄er safer and higher quality
products, as well. Therefore, the natural response of supermarkets has been to develop their
own standards in countries where public food quality standards are often inadequate and
lack proper enforcement.5 However, the quest for higher quality and safer food products can-
not be achieved without innovative procurement practices. These practices revolve around
the creation of vertical relationships with growers through the establishment of tighter pro-
curement contracts. Although the speci￿c form of the contractual relationship between the
grower and the supermarket can vary greatly depending on the context, there is arguably a
common denominator.
Typically, supermarkets require their growers to make a substantial up-front investment
in their operations. This investment ranges from new equipment purchases to the estab-
lishment of quality control and coordination systems. The literature analyzing supermarket
procurement practices also reports that supermarkets are playing new roles in the production
process. These roles essentially consist of a combination of intense production monitoring
and advising, sometimes using the support of public partners (Boselie, Henson and Weather-
spoon 2003). In practice, the advising is performed on the spot, when supermarket employees
visit producers and discuss with them problems encountered during the growing cycle. The
typical advice ranges from the proper way to apply fertilizers to the safe handling of pes-
ticides. In addition, supermarkets also take on a monitoring role that essentially protects
5As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, even with stringent domestic requirements in terms of
food standards, supermarkets may still develop their own private standards for two reasons. First via
product di⁄erentiation, the supermarket can lessen price competition. Second, by imposing high standards
requirements, supermarkets may prevent the entry of new competitors.
4their investment in the growers￿operations. Indeed, the relationship between farmers and
supermarkets features a strong moral hazard component. For instance, to certify that prod-
uct standards are met, but also that procured quantities are su¢ cient, supermarkets must
make sure growers follow speci￿c procedures and do not cheat or misrepresent their e⁄orts
and/or actions.6
Finally, although supermarkets rarely provide cash credit to farmers, they extend loans
in the form of input advances that are reimbursed later when the crop is sold.7 These input
loans, which range from seeds to fertilizers and pesticides, cover most of the necessary inputs
and their amount can be substantial relative to expected crop payments.8 Supermarkets also
attempt to absorb some of the growers￿risks related to market conditions. This is usually
achieved by committing to input and output prices prior to planting. Such commitments
arguably result in lower liquidity needs for growers and are, in that sense, equivalent to
additional loans. Overall, supermarkets￿objectives seem to ensure that the ￿nancial and
production risks faced by their grower base are sustainable and compatible with a long-term
dedication to safe and high-quality products (Henson, Masakure and Boselie 2005).
The organization of production by supermarkets, nevertheless, raises several questions.
For instance, it is not clear from a theoretical standpoint why supermarkets should provide
such a bundle of services. It is conceivable that advising services could be provided inde-
pendently of input loans. Farmers could ￿nance, possibly using moneylending services, the
purchase of the inputs necessary to carry out the production process.9 Supermarkets would
then purchase the crop, provided that it met a certain quality threshold. The mere fact
6The most common form of cheating faced by supermarkets is one in which farmers sell part of their
crop (for a higher price) to other grocers or local markets and, therefore, do not deliver the quantity that
was agreed upon (Gow and Swinnen 2001 and Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen forthcoming).
7Cash advances are, in fact, widespread in transition countries (Gow and Swinnen 2001).
8For instance, Boselie, Henson and Weatherspoon (2003) report that it takes a number of plantings for
producers to achieve a net overall pro￿t.
9In developing countries, credit loans extended by traditional moneylenders use growers￿crops as col-
lateral. To make sure that the grower repays his loan, the moneylenders closely monitor him during the
crop cycle to make sure that he does not secretly side-sell and then default on their loan by pretending to
have a bad harvest (See Aleem 1990 and Ho⁄ and Stiglitz 1998). Unlike advising, the monitoring exerted
by the supermarket is very similar to that of traditional moneylending (See Conning 2000 and Minten,
Randrianarison and Swinnen forthcoming, for the case of supermarket monitoring.)
5that such organization of production does not prevail in practice suggests that substantial
bene￿ts exist in bundling these tasks. In particular, to the extent that supermarkets are
keen to have a large grower base for, say, smooth risks, it is possible that this organization
of production will allow more farmers to access credit. More generally, we wonder how the
emergence of supermarkets will modify credit access for small growers.
Our de￿nition of the supermarket procurement process is very similar to that of contract
farming. Production ￿nancing in contract farming usually involves technical advising and
monitoring. As described by Conning (2000), contract farming, apart from the advising part,
is not di⁄erent from traditional moneylending. In particular, it possesses all the informal
aspects of moneylending. This type of lending has become prevalent in many developing
countries. For instance, Conning (2000) reports that during the last 20 years production
￿nance has become dominant in Chile. While we rely essentially on the survey of Lecofruit in
Madagascar by Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming), Table 1 below based on
Boselie, Henson and Weatherspoon (2003) summarizes characteristics of other cases studies.
In the table, the mechanisms for control and compliance, which either involve contract
farming or out-grower schemes, all entail some input lending to farmers. Moreover, in all
cases the standard to be achieved by farmers in terms of production are quiet stringent. For
instance the EUREP-GAP certi￿cation corresponds to the standard followed by European
supermarkets.10 Arguably, this is one of the most stringent standards in terms of quality
and safety of food products. The last column of Table 1 describes how in practice these
standards are met. Note that in most of the cases, company extension services are in charge
of following and guiding farmers during the production cycle. In other cases (Alice and
TOPS), advising services are provided by public organizations either for free or for reduced
fees.
10It should be noted that some local supermarkets do not always use contract farming, but merely buy































































































































































Table 1: Main Characteristics of supermarkets supply chains.
In this paper, we analyze the market for loans to growers by using a simple model
of ￿nancial contracting. In our framework, growers need to make a ￿nancial investment
before they can produce for the supermarket. In addition, during the production process,
proper monitoring and advising of growers enhances the likelihood of crop success. We
show that an organization in which the supermarket extends a loan and delegates advising
and monitoring to the same agent is preferred by the supermarket, and also by growers.
More precisely, bundling these tasks in the ￿nancial contract results in an organization in
which motivation costs or agency rents are reduced. This rent contraction results in more
poor growers obtaining loans. Our multitasking approach provides a new perspective to
apprehend this type of contract and can explain its relative superiority with respect to bank
￿nancing or traditional moneylending.
Furthermore, we show that supermarkets have a preference for wealthy farmers. However,
7this preference is not strictly monotonic and is subordinated to the assumption that the
supermarket can make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the farmer. When hired, small farmers
are shown to derive strictly positive rents from their relationship with supermarkets. Finally,
from a social standpoint, contracts o⁄ered by supermarkets might be suboptimal in the sense
that they entail excessive monitoring.
In what follows, we brie￿ y present the existing literature on lending in developing coun-
tries that is relevant to our work. We also relate our paper to the corporate ￿nance literature
on advising and venture capital. The model developed in the main section formalizes the
basic idea of bundling advising and monitoring tasks in the same ￿nancial contract. We then
study growers￿incentives in this setup. Finally, we study how standards a⁄ect competition
in the ￿nal market, and thereby in￿ uence growers￿access to loans.
Relation to the literature
The literature on moneylending in developing countries starts with the premise that borrow-
ers in developing countries usually have weak balance sheets, and therefore have di¢ culty
accessing ￿nancing. Most of the contributions in this ￿eld describe mechanisms by which
borrowers are able to commit to repay their loans.11 In the spirit of this literature on ￿-
nancial contracting in developing countries, our main result is to show that, by combining
these two tasks, the supermarket allows poorly collateralized growers to obtain a loan; a loan
that they would otherwise not obtain. This result is, to the best of our knowledge, novel.
Indeed, a few contributions have dealt with contract farming but these contributions remain
descriptive in nature (Key and Runsten (1999)). An exception is Swinnen and Vandeplas
(2007) who model contact farming as a two-sided moral hazard bilateral relationship. Like
us, they show that the farmer can derive a rent from this relationship. However, unlike us
they do not discuss credit access as a function of farmer￿ s wealth.
11For a good review of the literature on ￿nancial contracting in developing countries, we refer the reader
to ArmendÆriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
8In developing countries, production contracts between exporters or supermarkets on one
side and farmers on the other side usually involve loans in the form of an input advance.
In this relationship, the supermarkets not only behave as external consultants that provide
production advice as to what should be done with the product, but also play the role of
conventional moneylenders.
As investigated by Aleem (1990) and Ho⁄ and Stiglitz (1998), the informal lending ac-
tivity in developing countries is usually performed by local agents who can easily monitor
borrowers. Ho⁄ and Stiglitz (1998), especially emphasize the fact that the moneylending
activity is an informationally intensive activity characterized by monopolistic competition.
Similarly, our work assumes that supermarkets employ well-informed local agents to perform
the monitoring activity.12 This monitoring activity of supermarket employees is very close
in nature to that of moneylenders.13
Our work also shares common features with the literature on venture capital. Casamatta
(2003) studies under which conditions an entrepreneur (in fact, a borrower) should hire an
advisor. Similar to the supermarket agent in our model, when the venture capitalist advises
diligently, the probability of a successful project increases. Casamatta (2003) provides a
rationale for the existence of venture capitalists by showing that these advisors have to
provide funds, as well.
Although the investment scale of the project is quite di⁄erent, most agro-industries like
supermarkets play a role that is, arguably, qualitatively identical to that played by venture
12For instance, Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) describe the organization of the pro-
curement activity by retail chains in Madagascar. They write (p. 11):
Every extension agent, the chef de culture, is responsible for about thirty farmers. To supervise
these, (s)he coordinates ￿ve or six extension assistants (assistant de culture) that live in the
village itself. The chef de culture has a permanent salary paid by the ￿rm.
13Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) also describe the frequency and purpose of the
monitoring (p. 12):
During the cultivation period of the vegetables under contract, the contractor is visited on
average more than once (1.3 times) a week. This intensive monitoring is to ensure correct
production management as well as to avoid ￿ side-selling￿
9capitalists. Indeed, supermarket employees do not limit their activity to monitoring growers;
they continuously advise them on best production practices. Moreover, it is well documented
that supermarket agents have a speci￿c and substantial knowledge of horticulture and, in
that sense, are valuable advisors.14
From a purely theoretical standpoint, our contribution also relates to recent work on
the design of contracts involving multitasking agents. Laux (2001) shows how, in a limited-
liability contracting environment, wage cost can be reduced by assigning several independent
projects to a single agent rather than to several agents. By paying the agent only when all
projects succeed, the principal can relax the agent￿ s limited liability constraint by punishing
the agent for a given project by taking away payment on another.
More recently, Hueth and Marcoul (2007) model producer cooperatives by assuming that
members provide not only work (as input providers), but also monitor managerial activity
(as directors). The resulting multitasking structure is shown to strictly lower motivation
costs.
In the next section we develop a sequential model in which every organization choice
a⁄ects ￿nancial contracting outcomes. The ￿nancial contract model that we use is similar
in spirit to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).15 However, unlike the former, our model features
an additional advisory task as a key ingredient for project success.
Procurement organization: a model
Consider a rural economy made up of a population of farmers, an agrifood sector and a
￿nancial sector. All the agents of this economy are assumed to be risk neutral. While
14Again, Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) write:
The second constraint is human capital and long duration required for training of the assistants
de culture which organize and supervise the contracting farmers in the ￿eld. It is estimated
that it takes on average two or three years until the ￿rm will be able to give him/her full
responsibility in the ￿eld. This slows down growth and expansion.
15For applications of this framework to developing countries, see Conning (1999).
10the agrifood sector involves a supermarket/exporter and a procurement agent, the ￿nancial
sector involves a bank and a moneylender.
Farmers. Farmers are assumed to be heterogenous in their level of ￿nancial capacity,
A. The presence of the supermarket provides farmers with the opportunity to develop a
production project whose success is stochastic. More precisely, if the project is undertaken,
it yields a veri￿able income stream of R > 0 in case of success and 0 if it fails. >From the
farmer￿ s perspective, this project requires two inputs: his e⁄ort and a ￿xed-size investment I.
When the farmer works diligently, the probability of crop success is raised by pH. However,
diligence by the farmer is subject to moral hazard, as he may decide to shirk to enjoy a
private bene￿t B.16 In this case the farmer does raise at all the likelihood of crop success.
To make the problem non trivial, we assume that I > A, so that, in order to operate
farmers need to borrow I ￿ A > 0 from a ￿nancial investor.
The bank. The bank can provide I ￿ A to farmers. The bank is a passive but rational
investor; it extends a loan as long as it can recoup it in expectation. It is passive in the sense
that it does not have the capacity to supervise borrowing farmers. As a result, banks rely
primarily on collateral-based enforcement of their loans. The bank, when accepting farmers￿
loan applications, cannot observe whether farmers will exert e⁄ort or not. In line with Innes
(1990) and all of the literature on ￿nancial contracting, farmers are assumed to be protected
by limited liability; i.e. investors can at most seize the realized outcome. Thus, farmers need
to make a credible commitment to the bank on their supply of e⁄ort in order for their loan
applications to be accepted.
Financing can also be eased by using the services of a procurement agent and a money-
lender.
The moneylender. The moneylender is a member of the rural community working for
the bank, whose function is to monitor farmers. He has an informational advantage and the
16Based on a survey of Ivory Coast agricultural producers, Biais, Azam, Dia and Maurel (2001) estimate
that this opportunity cost of e⁄ort is important. Speci￿cally, they report a value for B as large as 40 percent
of the investment.
11bank cannot ascertain whether the monitoring is carried out seriously or not. Therefore,
diligent monitoring must be induced through contingent payments. E⁄ective monitoring
by the moneylender implies that he privately incurs a cost m > 0. Similar to Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997), the impact of monitoring is to reduce the farmers￿opportunity costs of
misbehaving by reducing the bene￿t of shirking to b, with B > b. To make the demand for
the moneylender service a viable option, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1
B ￿ b ￿ m:
This assumption simply states that the reduction in the private bene￿t of the farmer,
B ￿ b, is greater than the private cost of monitoring, m. Under this assumption, it will
be shown later that the compensation left to the moneylender to induce proper monitoring
is less than the reduction in the farmer￿ s private bene￿t. It is intuitive that under this
assumption monitoring improves the feasibility of the crop project.17
The procurement agent. The procurement agent is also a member of the rural com-
munity possibly trained by the supermarket in delivering production advice. This advice
helps to bring the product in conformity with the supermarket￿ s speci￿c standards. E⁄ec-
tive advising from the procurement agent will raise the probability of success of the project
by pA. In other words, when the advisor and the farmer are both diligent, the probability
of crop success is pA + pH. The advising activity is itself subject to moral hazard, as the
procurement agent may prefer shirking on his advising mission to avoid a private cost c. To







17Note that undertaking monitoring implies that the social value of the project is reduced by m. Therefore,
from a social standpoint it is a pure loss, and monitoring should be undertaken only if it improves project
feasibility.
12This assumption implies that the value of the project is increased by incurring the advising
motivation costs of the agent. Thus, whoever makes the production contract o⁄er always
￿nd it optimal to hire a procurement agent. The procurement agent could also be trained
by the supermarket in monitoring. Like the moneylender, he may decide to shirk to avoid
incurring a private cost m.
The supermarket. The agrifood company has to decide the scope of its activity. The
company can hire a procurement agent whose task is simply to advise the farmer. In that
case, the ￿nancing part is left to the conventional banking sector (here, the bank and the
moneylender). The company can also choose to ￿integrate these tasks under the same roof￿
by hiring an agent who will both advise and monitor the farmer. In this organizational
choice, the monitoring role is assumed by the supermarket agent. As such, the supermarket
will replace the bank as a passive investor. For simplicity, the opportunity cost of funds is
normalized to 1 for both the bank and the supermarket.
Finally, we make the following assumption on the parameters:
Assumption 3
maxfpHR + c;pAR ￿ c + Bg ￿ I < 0;
(pH + pA)R ￿ c ￿ m ￿ I > 0:
In words, the ￿rst condition states that operating the project with a low e⁄ort in at
least one moral hazard dimension is ruled out. This assumption implies that, in equilibrium,
no loan contract that gives one agent incentives to misbehave will be granted. The second
condition implies that projects involving monitoring generate a strictly positive surplus.
Summarizing a bit: in the crop production process, diligence in both advising and farming
generates a probability pH + pA of success, but when shirking on advising and diligence
in farming occurs (respectively, diligence in advising and shirking on farming occurs), the
13probability of success is then pH (resp. pA).18 When shirking occurs on both tasks, crop
failure is certain. Lastly, the purpose of monitoring is to lower the farmer￿ s private bene￿t
from B to b.
The interaction between the agents described above is modeled as a four stage sequential
game. The timing of events is as follows.
Organizational choice. In the ￿rst stage, the supermarket decides between two types of
production organization: one in which it hires an agent whose task is solely to advise the
farmer on the operation and another in which it hires an agent not only for the advising but
also for the monitoring tasks.
Contracting. The agent who holds the bargaining power, the farmer or the supermarket,
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to all the parties involved in the production cycle. More
speci￿cally, the o⁄er is a loan agreement specifying a sharing rule according to which, in case
of success, the revenue R is divided among all participants. In case of failure, limited liability
implies that all participants receive 0.19 If the contract is accepted, the game proceeds to
investment; otherwise it ends at this point and all participants are free to consume their
initial endowment.20 Immediately after the contract is signed, the farmer invests A while
the bank (or the supermarket, pending on the chosen organization of production in the ￿rst
stage) delivers I ￿ A.21
E⁄ort choice. The advisor and the monitor (if one is involved) move ￿rst.22 They
simultaneously decide to monitor (or not) and advise (or not) the farmer. The farmer then
18This additive speci￿cation implies that e⁄ort by the farmers and the advisor are not complementary.
Instead, each contributes separately to improve the project success likelihood. This assumption certainly
simpli￿es our computation. Introducing some complementarity between the advising and farming tasks
would reinforce our main results.
19The farmer￿ s net payo⁄ in case of failure is thus ￿A, while it is ￿(I ￿ A) for the investor.
20In the event of the contract being turned down, the farmer would consume A and his net payo⁄ would
be 0.
21We assume that once I is invested, it is sunk and it has no recovery value in case of failure. This may
be the case if the investment is highly speci￿c to the agroindustrial ￿rm or if we are dealing with input
advances that are consumed during the growth cycle. However, it is possible to assume that the investment
has a salvage value if the project fails. Making a ￿redeployability￿assumption would ease credit access but
would not qualitatively modify our results.
22For the monitor, this might involve, for instance, observing the farmer￿ s habits or determining before
they occur when and where ￿pirate sales￿are likely to happen.
14observes the outcome of the game and, in turn, decides to be diligent or not during the
growth cycle.
Production outcome. The production outcome is realized and the return of the project
is shared according to the agreement signed at the contracting stage.
The contract design problem consists in optimally sharing the project return, R, without
destroying incentives for diligent behavior by the farmer, the moneylender and the procure-
ment agent.
To understand the rationale behind the supermarket￿ s choice of the production organiza-
tion, the game is solved by backward induction. In the next sections, the optimal contract
is systematically established for each potential organization of production; i.e. an organiza-
tion where the bank ￿nances farmers, the moneylender monitors and the procurement agent
advises and an organization where the supermarket ￿nances farmers while the procurement
agent monitors and advises farmers. The comparison of the (privately) optimal contracts
under alternative organization of production will determine the organization preference of
the supermarket. We ￿rst begin with the case in which the farmer has all the bargaining
power at the contracting stage.
Monitoring and advising by separate agents: the farmer
makes the o⁄er
We consider an organization of production where the supermarket hires the procurement
agent to advise, and where ￿nancing and monitoring are performed by the bank and the
moneylender, respectively. While, according to Assumption 2, farmers always have an inter-
est in requiring an advisor, it is by no means guaranteed that farmers will ￿nd it optimal to
hire a moneylender. However, for the sake of exposition, we focus on the most general case,
where the four parties are involved in production. The farmer has to share the project return
with the moneylender, the procurement agent and the bank when formulating the ￿nancial
15contract. This optimal sharing rule can be established by solving the following program
max
Rf
fUf = (pH + pA)Rf ￿ Ag
R = Rf + Rm + Rp + Rb; (1)
(pH + pA)Rf ￿ pARf + b (2)
(pH + pA)Rp ￿ c ￿ pHRp (3)
(pH + pA)Rm ￿ m ￿ pARm (4)
(pH + pA)Rb ￿ I ￿ A: (5)
Here, Uf denotes the farmer￿ s expected net return from the project, while Rf, Rp; Rm
and Rb denote the success-contingent stakes of the project obtained by the farmer, the
moneylender, the procurement agent and the bank, respectively.
The ￿rst constraint (1) states that the project return R is divided among the contracting
parties. The following expressions (2), (3) and (4) denote the incentive constraints of the
farmer, the procurement agent and moneylender, respectively. As usual in agency mod-
els, each constraint requires that the agent earns at least as much from being diligent (i.e.
produce e⁄ort for the farmer, advise for the procurement agent and monitor for the money-
lender) than from shirking. The left-hand sides of (2), (3) and (4) represent the expected
net return assuming diligence of the farmer, the procurement agent and the moneylender,
respectively. The right hand side of these expressions denotes their expected net returns
when shirking.23
Finally, the last expression denotes the bank participation constraint. The banking sector
is assumed perfectly competitive, and in order to accept a loan application the bank should
23Note that the sequential nature of the game is important in interpreting the constraints. For instance,
when the farmer deviates from ￿diligence￿in expression (2), it is taken into account that the monitor and the
advisor have been induced to be diligent. Indeed, when the farmer shirks, his private bene￿t is b (monitoring
is e⁄ective) and the probability of success is pA (the farmer has been advised).
16at least break-even. The left-hand side of (5) refers to the expected bene￿ts from lending,
while the right-hand side is the market value of the fund supplied by the local bank. Recall
that the opportunity cost of funds is normalized to 1.
The solution of the above program is given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 (Monitoring and advising by separate agents) When the organization
chosen by the supermarket is such that the bank ￿nances farmers, the procurement agent ad-
vises while the moneylender monitors, there exist two thresholds of ￿nancial capacity, given by
Aa = I ￿ (pA + pH)(R ￿ c=pA ￿ B=pH) and Aam = I ￿ (pA + pH)[R ￿ c=pA ￿ (b + m)=pH]
such that the optimal contract has the following features:
￿ if A ￿ Aa, farmers borrow solely from the bank. Their expected net return is given by
Ua
f = (pA + pH)[R ￿ c=pA] ￿ I;
￿ if Aa ￿ A ￿ Aam, farmers borrow from banks and hire a moneylender. Their expected
net return is given by Uam
f = (pA + pH)[R ￿ c=pA ￿ m=pH] ￿ I;
￿ if A < Aam, farmers do not have access to credit.
This Proposition states that wealthy farmers have an advantage in obtaining loans, as
they can bypass the services of the moneylender. In essence, monitoring allows poorer
farmer to obtain credit. Finally, very poor farmers simply cannot access credit, even though
according to Assumption 3, these projects are socially worthwhile. The existence of credit
rationing in our context is driven by informational frictions. Indeed, moral hazard, together
with limited liability, implies that agency rents have to be distributed to implement the
project. This creates a wedge between the social value of the project and the total motivation
costs that must be incurred to implement it.
The proof for this result conveys important intuitions useful to understanding the rest
of the paper. We therefore give it in the text. Consider ￿rst the contract when the farmer
decides to hire the supermarket￿ s procurement agent but not the moneylender. Since there is
17no moneylender, we can set Rm equal to 0 and drop the constraint (4). Without monitoring,
the private bene￿t of the farmer when shirking is B. Thus, the farmer￿ s incentive constraint











Substituting back (6) and (7) into the sharing rule (1), the maximum share that can be
pledged by the farmer to the bank while applying for a loan is given by
R
a








b is referred to as the pledgeable income. The pledgeable income is the maximum
amount that can be credibly promised to investors, i.e. the bank, without destroying the
incentives of the agents involved in the ￿nancial contract (here, the farmer and the procure-
ment agent).
If the farmer were to pledge more than Ra
b; then the incentive constraint of the farmer
(6) and/or the procurement agent (7) would not be satis￿ed. As a consequence, the project
prospect would be jeopardized and the bank would optimally reject the loan application.
More importantly, the pledgeable income creates a lower bound on the level of ￿nancial
capacity that the farmer must hold to obtain credit. Indeed, substituting back (8) into (5)
leads to










18Thus, farmers with wealth A < Aa cannot convince a bank that they will reimburse the
loan entirely, for the latter knows that at least one incentive constraint will be violated.
Recalling that the farmer is residual claimant on the contract, constraints (3), (4) and
(5) must be binding, which implies that
U
a







Not surprisingly, because the moneylending sector is competitive, the farmer captures
the surplus of the project less the share given to the procurement agent.
Finally, farmers with a level of ￿nance lower than Aa can ask for the supervision of a
moneylender to obtain a loan from the bank. Under the supervision of a moneylender, his
private bene￿t from shirking equals b. Hence, assuming proper monitoring by the money-





In a sense, by hiring a moneylender, the borrower commits to curtail his share in the
project to raise his pledgeable income. However, for the moneylender to e⁄ectively monitor,
according to (4) he should be provided a share of the project such that Rm ￿ m
pH:














Given Assumption 1, Ram
b > Ra
b and therefore by hiring a moneylender, the farmer raises
his pledgeable income. Substituting (12) into (5) leads to










19As expected, by raising the farmers pledgeable income, monitoring reduces the minimum
level of ￿nancing necessary to obtain a loan.














Given that a share of the project now has to be forfeited to the moneylender to guarantee




f. Therefore, when given the choice between hiring the
services of a moneylender or not (i.e. farmers with a level of ￿nance A ￿ Aa), a farmer will
always prefer not to hire a moneylender.
Finally, note that the moneylender and the procurement agent will both enjoy a positive
expected net return of ￿ml = (pA + pH)Rm ￿ m = mpA=pH and ￿a = (pA + pH)Rp ￿ c =
cpH=pA respectively. These positive expected net returns guarantee their participation in
the project. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Monitoring and advising by the procurement agent
In this section, we now explore the possibility that the supermarket decides to play the role
of the ￿nancial sector. To do so, it provides loans to farmers, instructs the procurement
agent to monitor the reimbursement of these loans and also trains him to advise farmers
on crop matters. In practice, the loan often takes the form of an input advance on seeds,
pesticides or fertilizers.24
Unlike the previous case, the multitasking nature of the procurement agent now generates
several incentive constraints. First, the procurement agent must be given reward Rp, such
that he does not want to work on the monitoring task alone. His incentive constraint is
24The fact that the supermarket o⁄ers inputs rather than cash has several rationales. First, there are
economies of scale in procurement; supermarkets or grocers often serve several thousand growers. Second,
there is arguably less scope for diversion of physical inputs, although it is still possible that farmers may try
to resell them in a secondary market.





Conversely, he should not want to shirk on the monitoring task while working on the





Finally, the procurement agent can decide to shirk on both tasks, in which case the





Overall, the procurement agent will be diligent in performing both tasks if constraints














Furthermore, with the procurement agent performing both monitoring and advising,
production will involve three agents: the procurement agent, the farmer and the supermarket.
In this organization of production, to obtain ￿nancing from the supermarket, the contract
proposed by the farmer should solve the following program
max
Rf
fUf = (pH + pA)Rf ￿ Ag (19)
subject to

















(pH + pA)Rs ￿ I ￿ A:
Here, Rs denotes the share of the project received by the supermarket. Solving the
program above gives the following result.
Proposition 2 (Monitoring and advising by the same agent) When the organization
chosen by the supermarket is such that the supermarket ￿nances farmers and the procure-
ment agent advises and monitors, there exist two thresholds of ￿nancial capacity, Aa and
AS










; such that the optimal contract of-
fered by the farmer to the supermarket and the procurement agent has the following features:
￿ if A ￿ Aa, farmers borrow solely from the supermarket. Their expected net return is
given by Ua
f.
￿ if Aa ￿ A ￿ AS
am, farmers borrow from the supermarket, which hires a multitask
procurement agent.
Their expected net return is given by US










￿ if A < AS
am, farmers do not have access to credit.
As in Proposition 1, the farmer will not require supervision by the procurement agent
if A ￿ Aa.25 However, when the farmer has insu¢ cient wealth (i.e., when A < Aa), he
will accept monitoring by the supermarket agent. Unlike the moneylender, the procurement
agent agrees to perform two tasks: monitoring and advising. As previously mentioned, for
25In this case, we assume that the loan is extended by the supermarket. In fact, nothing prevents the
farmer from borrowing from a bank to ￿nance the inputs necessary for the project.
22the procurement agent to be diligent in both monitoring and advising, expression (18) should
be veri￿ed. This implies the following pledgeable income
R
S















Thus, to obtain credit a farmer￿ s level of ￿nance should be such that
A ￿ A
S

















Furthermore, by the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, it can be shown that the expected
net return of the farmer having access to credit can be expressed as:
U
S














Finally, it is easy to check that ￿S








Therefore, it is con￿rmed that the procurement agent always want to participate.
Having established Propositions 1 and 2, it seems natural to inquire about the relative
merit of both organizational forms. The next Proposition is the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3 (Monitoring and Advising) At the ￿rst stage of the game, the supermar-
ket (weakly) prefers an organization, in which it ￿nances farmers and hires a procurement
agent who both advises and monitors. In this organization, the number of farmers who ob-
tain loans strictly increases in comparison to an organization where advising and monitoring
tasks are left to distinct agents.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, when advising and monitoring are performed by separate
agents, farmers should have a minimum level of ￿nance at least equal to Aam to obtain a loan
(equation (13)). According to Proposition 2, when monitoring and advising are performed
by the procurement agent, farmers should then have a minimum level of ￿nance at least
equals to AS
am (equation (21)). Comparing these two expressions yields Aam > AS
am.
23When the farmer has all bargaining power, the supermarket is indi⁄erent between the two
types of organization. However, two (unmodelled) arguments can justify a preference by the
supermarket for having a large supply base. First, a supply base of numerous farmers who
are geographically dispersed acts as an e⁄ective mechanism to reduce the risk of widespread
crop failures due to disease and (to a lesser extent) weather. It thus safeguards the ability
of the supermarket to ful￿ll customer orders (Henson, Masakure and Boselie 2005). Second,
a large supply base can act as a switching cost reduction mechanism thereby decreasing the
search costs for new farmers.
The intuition behind the second part of the Proposition is as follows. Heuristically,
by contracting with the same agent on both tasks the supermarket creates an incentive
complementarity between the two tasks. For instance, it is possible that the agent derives
a substantial rent by, say, monitoring diligently. Bundling and rewarding the two tasks in a
single payment enhances incentives, in the sense that the prospect of losing this rent makes
the agent less likely to overlook his advising duties. In other words, in this case, the agent
is essentially a free advisor. Conversely, the agent could derive a substantial rent in advising
and the fear of losing this (advising) rent would essentially make him a free monitor.
Arguably, such a feedback loop does not exist when both tasks are performed by distinct
agents. To see this formally, note that the minimum motivation cost necessary to insure











MS is the sum of the farmer, moneylender and procurement agent payments consistent

















24Our result points to a bene￿cial role of supermarkets for farmers. However, it is im-
portant to note that the occurrence of such contracts results in the disappearance of ￿tra-
ditional￿moneylenders in our model. In fact, as already noted by Conning (2000) in the
Chilean context, the expansion of contract farming by supermarkets or agroindustrial ￿rms
has essentially resulted in the removal of traditional moneylending.
Corollary 4 Farmers prefer an organization of production where the tasks of advising and
monitoring are performed by the same agent.
Proof. We compare the expected returns of the farmer under alternative organization.
While farmers only requiring advising to receive funding (i.e., with a level of ￿nance such
that A ￿ Aa) are indi⁄erent between the two organizations of production. For farmers
requiring monitoring, we have US
f > Uam
f . Therefore, farmers will prefer an organization of
production where monitoring and advising are performed by the same agent.
This result is also a direct consequence of the fact that the bundling of both tasks reduces
the minimum rent necessary to insure proper incentives. This rent reduction leaves a larger
share of the project to be captured by farmers.
The supermarket holds the bargaining power
So far, all the bargaining power in the contractual relationship was in the hands of the
farmers. In reality, the balance of power between farmers and supermarkets arguably leans
toward the latter. We now study a situation in which the supermarket holds all the bargaining
power and proposes a sharing rule to the farmers and the procurement agent, in order to
maximize its expected pro￿ts, ￿. In this contractual relationship, not only should farmers
be willing to exert e⁄ort, but also to participate. The participation constraint of a farmer is
given by
Uf = (pH + pA)Rf ￿ A ￿ 0;











The problem of the supermarket is expressed as
max
Rs
f￿ = (pH + pA)Rs ￿ (I ￿ A)g
subject to






















(pH + pA)Rs ￿ I ￿ A:









AI = (pH + pA)
￿
RS
p ￿ c=pA ￿ b=pH
￿
, that are used in the following result.
Proposition 5 In the second stage of the game, the contract proposed by the supermarket
to the farmers and the procurement agent has the following features:
￿ if RS
p = c=pA; the farmer accepts a production contract that stipulates monitoring and
advising by the procurement agent. The latter earns expected net return ￿S
a. If
￿A ￿ (pH + pA)b=pH, the supermarket earns ￿ = (pH + pA)[R ￿ c=pA ￿ b=pH]￿I,
while the farmer has no rent, i.e. Uf = 0.
￿(pH + pA)b=pH > A ￿ AS
am, the farmer￿ s net return is Uf = (pH + pA)b=pH￿A >




pA; then the farmer accepts a production contract. If
26￿A ￿ (pH + pA)B=pH, the farmer￿ s net return is Uf = 0 and the contract only
stipulates advising by the agent who earns ￿a while ￿ = (pH + pA)[R ￿ c=pA]￿I.
￿(pH + pA)B=pH > A ￿ AI, the farmer￿ s net return is Uf = (pH + pA)B=pH ￿
A > 0. The contract only stipulates advising by the agent who earns ￿a while
￿ = (pH + pA)[R ￿ c=pA ￿ B=pH] ￿ (I ￿ A).
￿AI > A ￿ (pH + pA)b=pH, the farmer￿ s net return is Uf = 0. The contract
stipulates monitoring and advising by the agent who earns ￿S
a: The supermarket￿ s






￿(pH + pA)b=pH > A ￿ AS
am, the farmer￿ s net return is Uf = (pH + pA)b=pH￿A >
0. The contract stipulates monitoring and advising by the agent who earns ￿S
a: The





￿ (I ￿ A) > 0:
￿ if A < AS
am, the farmer does not obtain a production contract, i.e., Uf = 0.
One of the main ￿ndings of Proposition 5 is that loan extension is not in￿ uenced by
whoever holds the bargaining power. Indeed, as in Proposition 2, loan extension is up to a
￿nance level A = AS
am. Thus, this result stems from the delegation to a single agent of the
monitoring and advising tasks, not from the bargaining power allocation. In our model, the
bargaining position of each player only determines how the surplus is allocated among all
participants but has no bearing on how many farmers are potentially entitled to produce.
This Proposition also provides insights on a focal issue in the empirical literature on super-
markets, namely the fate of small farmers in the emergence of these agroindustrial companies.








































































Figure 1: (a): supermarket expected net return. (b): farmers￿expected net return.
The equilibrium net returns of the farmer and the supermarket are represented as a
function of farmers￿wealth A. From panel (a), it seems clear that the supermarket has a
monotonically increasing preference for well-capitalized farmers. The nature of the relation-
ship explains this result. Indeed, in this relationship, the supermarket is essentially trying to
extract diligent care from farmers, using a combination of monitoring services and incentive
payments. When misbehaving, relatively wealthy farmers lose their initial outlay A and
this is su¢ cient to keep them on their toes and insure their diligence. With lower initial
outlays, poorer farmers stand to lose less from shirking, and the supermarket must insure
diligence by relying relatively more on incentive payments, which are costly. This result
provides argument for the empirical literature describing the emergence of supermarkets in
developing countries, which has forcefully argued that supermarkets tend to contract with
large, wealthy farmers, while poorer farmers are left behind (see for instance, Dolan and
Humphrey 2000 and Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal 2001).
Keeping in mind that, after rewarding the agent, the residual project surplus is shared
28between the supermarket and the farmer, panel (b) is in fact a negative image of panel (a).
It shows that even though the supermarket designs the contract, some farmers do obtain
a positive surplus from their business relationship with the supermarket. For the reasons
explained above, this, in fact, bene￿ts less capitalized farmers. Therefore, the existence of
strictly positive rents should attract more farmers. In fact, the long waiting list to enter
into the supermarket procurement system observed in many developing countries is at least
consistent with this result (on this issue, see Henson, Masakure and Boselie, 2005). If we
speculate that a supermarket tries to extend its grower base, then the upper hand of the
poorest farmers (i.e., those with level of ￿nance such that A > AS
am ) should bene￿t from the
implementation of the supermarket arrangement. These ￿ndings also seem consistent with
recent empirical evidence (HernÆndez, Reardon and BerdeguØ 2007).
Although the implementation of such contracts by the supermarket seems to have socially
attractive properties, it is by no means clear that they are optimal in the sense that they
implement the highest possible surplus.
Corollary 6 (Excessive monitoring) When RS
p 6= c
pA then the supermarket over moni-
tors farmers with a level of ￿nance such that Aa < A < AI. This implies a social loss.
Proof. The pledgeable income of the farmers with a level of ￿nance such that Aa < A < AI
is su¢ cient for them to obtain ￿nancing without monitoring. If this were the case, the social





￿ I. However, to maximize its net return, the
supermarket ￿nds it optimal to monitor these farmers, which reduces the social surplus to






Such supermarket￿ s behavior arises because monitoring e⁄ectively transfers a rent from
the farmer to it. For a small additional payment, the supermarket assigns the agent an
additional monitoring task that ultimately results in (much) smaller incentive payments made
to farmers. Here, monitoring is not motivated by feasibility issues, but is just a socially costly
rent extraction mechanism. Figure 1 features in thick dashes what the returns would be,
had the supermarket behaved like a social surplus maximizer. In the light of this theoretical
29￿nding, several recent puzzling empirical results may, perhaps, ￿nd a natural explanation.
For instance, Bellemare (2006) who analyses production contracts between supermarkets and
farmers, fails to ￿nd strong empirical support for monitoring by supermarkets as a means
to raise farmer productivity. Such an observation seems consistent with the result stated
above.
Before concluding this section, we must note that an important assumption of our baseline
model is arguably the absence of specialization costs. Indeed, we assume that the super-
market agent privately bears cost m + c when performing both tasks. Although it could be
argued that synergies might exist between the two tasks, one could also argue that there
is convexity in e⁄ort cost as the agent performs two tasks. In the appendix, we show that
the choice by the supermarket of this type of organization is robust to the introduction of
such convexity; that is, socially worthwhile projects that would otherwise be infeasible are
undertaken, even though the choice of a single agent is cost ine¢ cient. The supermarket
tolerates some ine¢ ciency in the performance of the two tasks, as long as, the reduction in
agency costs results in a higher pro￿t.
Conclusion
This paper explores the peculiar relationship between supermarkets and farmers that exists
in developing countries. This relationship is modeled as a ￿nancial contract, where the
farmer provides e⁄ort to the supermarket in exchange not only for technical assistance, but
also for credit and infrastructure support. By doing so, we open the "black box" of the
supermarket procurement system.
The motivation of the supermarket to provide not only input credits, but also technical
assistance in the framework is as follows. By combining monitoring and advising of farmers,
supermarkets reduce the agency cost and gain some advantage with respect to conventional
moneylenders. This agency cost reduction in turn may widen the scope for ￿nancing farmers.
30This result holds true whether the supermarket or farmers hold the bargaining power. Even
more, if the multiplication of the tasks performed entails additional motivation costs, such
procurement organization will still be favored by the supermarket and remains potentially
conducive to credit extension to smaller farmers. Moreover, this result also provides a ra-
tionale for recent empirical evidence that shows that the spread of supermarkets, far from
leading to the exclusion of poorer farmers, improves their credit access.
However, the allocation of the bargaining power in the contractual relationship will deter-
mine the distributional e⁄ects of the spread of supermarkets. In particular, if the bargaining
power remains in the hands of the supermarket, we show that the supermarket will prefer
targeting the wealthiest producers. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Wealthier
farmers make substantially higher investments in the supermarket project. Thus, no ￿nan-
cial compensation is necessary to guarantee their diligence, unlike with poorer farmers. It is,
thus, more pro￿table for the supermarket to contract with wealthier farmers. Nevertheless,
our results show no reasons, for the supermarket, against the involvement of smallholders in
its procurement system. As it can still be pro￿table for the supermarket to contract with
them.
Finally, when given su¢ cient bargaining power, we ￿nd that the supermarket endorses
monitoring as a socially costly rent extraction mechanism.
References
ArmendÆriz de Aghion, B. and J. Morduch. 2005. "The Economics of Micro￿nance."
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Allem, I. 1990. "Imperfect Information, screening and the costs of informal lending: A
study of rural credits markets in Pakistan." World Bank Economic Review 4: 329-349.
Bellemare, M. 2006. ￿Testing the e⁄ect of Monitoring in Production Contracts: Evidence
from Madagascar,￿Mimeo, Terry Sanford Institute of Public policy, Duke University.
31Biais, B., Azam, J.P., Dia, M. and C. Maurel. 2001. "Informal and Formal Credit
Markets and Credit Rationing in Cote d￿Ivoire." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17(4):
520-534.
Boselie D., Henson, S. and D. Weatherspoon. 2003. "Supermarket Procurement Prac-
tices in Developing Countries: Rede￿ning the Roles of the Public and Private Sectors."
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 1155-1161.
Casamatta, C. 2003. ￿Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with venture
capitalists.￿Journal of Finance 58(5): 2059-2085.
Conning, J. 1999. "Outreach, Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-
Monitored Lending." Journal of Development Economics 60(1): 51-77.
Conning, J. 2000. ￿Of pirates and moneylenders: ￿nancial intermediation and the changing
pattern of credit access in a rural market in Chile,￿Department of Economics, Williams
College, Williamstown, M.A.
Dolan, C. and J. Humphrey. 2000. "Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The
Impact of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry." Journal of Development
Studies 37:147￿ 76.
Dolan, C., Humphrey, J. and C. Harris-Pascal. 2001. ￿Horticulture Commodity
Chains: The Impact of the U.K. Market on the African Fresh Vegetable Industry.￿Working
Paper No. 96, Institute for Development Studies, Sussex.
Fernando, B., BerdeguØ, J.A., Flores, L., Mainville, D. and T. Reardon. 2003.
"Supermarkets and Produce Quality and Safety Standards in Latin America" American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 1147-1154.
Gow, H. and J. Swinnen. 2001. "Private enforcement capital and contract enforcement
in transition countries." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(3): 686-690.
32Henson, S., Masakure, O. and D. Boselie. 2005. "Private food safety and quality
standards for fresh produce exporters: The case of Hortico Agrisystems, Zimbabwe." Food
Policy 30: 371-384.
HernÆndez, R., Reardon, T. and BerdeguØ J. 2007. ￿Supermarkets, wholesalers, and
tomato growers in Guatemala￿Agricultural Economics 36 (3), 281￿ 290.
Ho⁄, K. and J. Stiglitz. 1998. "Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in
a monopolistically competitive market." Journal of Development Economics 55: 485-518.
Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole. 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the
Real Sector." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3): 663-691.
Hueth, B. and P. Marcoul. 2007. "The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit". Available
at Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
Innes, R. 1990. "Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting With Ex-Ante Action
Choices." Journal of Economic Theory 52: 45-68.
Key, N. and D. Runsten. 1999. "Contract farming, small-holders, and Rural Develop-
ment in Latin America: the organization of agroprocessing ￿rms and the scale of outgrower
production." World Development 27 (2): 381￿ 401.
Laux, C. 2001. "Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects."
RAND Journal of Economics 32(3): 514-26.
Minten, B., Randrianarison, L. and J. Swinnen. Forthcoming. "Global retail chains
and poor farmers: Evidence from Madagascar." World Development.
Reardon, T. and J.A. BerdeguØ. 2002. "The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in Latin
America: Challenges and Opportunities for Development." Development Policy Review 20:
317￿34.
33Reardon, T. and E. Farina. 2002. "The Rise of Private of Food Quality and Safety Stan-
dards: Illustrations from Brazil." International Food and Agribusiness Management Review
4: 413-421.
Reardon, T., Timmer, C.P., Barrett, C. B. and J. BerdeguØ. 2003. "The Rise
of Supermarkets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America." American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 85(5): 1140-1146.
Swinnen, J. and A. Vandeplas. 2008. " Quality, E¢ ciency Premia, and Development."
Working Paper No. 184/2007, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance,
Leuven.
Trail, W.B. 2006. " The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets?" Development Policy Review 24(2):
163-174.
Weatherspoon, D. and T. Reardon. 2003. " The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa: Impli-
cations for Agrifood Systems and the Rural Poor." Development Policy Review 21: 333-355.
34Appendix
Proof of proposition 5. Let us ￿rst consider the subgame where monitoring and advising
remain in the hands of the procurement agent in the organization of production. Irrespective
of who (the supermarket or the farmer) is formulating the sharing rule, an organization of
production that assigns both the tasks of monitoring and advising to the procurement agent
will minimize motivation costs, as shown in Proposition 3. Alike farmers, this rent reduction
allows the supermarket to capture a larger share of the project and, thereby, the supermarket
prefers this organization of production. Furthermore, given that the pledgeable income by
farmers is determined by the incentive constraints of each agent (which is also una⁄ected
by varying degrees of bargaining power), their pledgeable incomes also remain unchanged.
Hence, as shown in Proposition 2, farmers with a level of ￿nance such that AS
am ￿ A will
have access to credit.
Procurement agent. As previously shown, when only advising, the procurement agent
should receive at least Rp = c










Farmer. With monitoring by the procurement agent, the share received by the farmer
should verify (23). Hence, we have to distinguish two cases. First, if A <
(pA+pH)b
pH , the
farmer￿ s incentive constraint is binding, which implies that Rf = b





pH ￿ A, the farmer￿ s participation constraint is now binding, which
implies that Rf = A
pH+pA and Uf = 0. By the same reasoning, without monitoring by







: If A <
(pA+pH)B
pH , the farmer￿ s incentive constraint is binding and
Uf =
(pH+pA)B
pH ￿ A, while if
(pA+pH)B
pH ￿ A, the farmer￿ s participation constraint is binding
Uf = 0.
Supermarket. To maximize its share of the project, the supermarket will have to min-
imize the share received by both the procurement agent and the farmer. When farm-
ers are monitored, again there are two cases. If AS
am ￿ A <
(pA+pH)b
pH , the supermar-






￿ (I ￿ A), while for A >
(pA+pH)b













￿(I ￿ A) for A <
(pA+pH)B






wise. Finally, the supermarket will prefer farmers to be monitored as long as it earns a higher
net return. Clearly, if RS
p = c
pA, the supermarket always imposes monitoring to farmers, else








Robustness to convexity in e⁄ort costs. Let us de￿ne ￿ as being the additional
cost of motivation when two tasks (monitoring and advising) have to be performed by the














Furthermore, when monitoring and advising are left to separate agents, the supermarket￿ s
expected net return corresponds to












￿ (I ￿ A): (25)
At the opposite, when the procurement agent monitors and advises the supermarket￿ s
expected net return is given by













m + c + ￿
pA + pH
￿￿
￿ (I ￿ A): (26)
Corollary 7 If performance of two tasks by the same agent entails an additional cost, then,
as long as this cost is not too high, the supermarket still favors an organization, that assigns
these tasks to the same agent and access to credit will be maximized with such organization
of production.








36expected returns of the supermarket will be greater when the procurement agent advises and
monitors. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that it also implies that AS
am < Aam.
37